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Current leadership theories appear to have not kept up with modern theories of the firm and 
modern financial approaches.  Now there appears to be a major disconnect between leadership 
measures and the firm’s financial performance.  This situation can be seen through the general 
practice of closely identifying leaders with their firms, and yet, relying on 
organizational/market/industry variables to investigate the financial results of the firm in 
empirical business studies which directly points toward the need for an outcome-based 
perspective of leadership theory.  This can be achieved by the assessment of their resource 
utilization and value-adding propensity in the course of performing their ‘stewardship’ and 
‘agency’ roles.  This paper proposes a framework for a leadership perspective, based on 
organizational results, using the financial signature concept.  A sample from Fortune 500 
companies was used in the study.  The results show that leaders, by playing a dual roles of agent 
and steward, not only have a strong influence on their firm’s financial outcome, but also exhibit 
specific level of propensity to conserving or spending resources that is a direct reflection of their 
ability to govern in relation to their stakeholders expectations.  This finding has many implications 
in understanding corporate behavior and public perception.  It could also provide important 
elements to studying ethical and finance behavioral issues that affect many modern corporations 
in recent years. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
he business world, in recent memory, hasn‟t been as focused as ever on business leaders‟ pattern of 
spending. This can be explained by the recent economic downturn but also as direct results of the 
recent debacles from top executives misconduct and mismanagement of their firm‟s asset. Between 
2002 and 2007, the popular business media reported on several ethics breaches on the part of CEOs and top 
executives of large firms on almost regular basis. But as firms are trying to correct those executives transgression, 
they are also facing another dilemma in hiring their replacement and making sure that previous mistakes won‟t be 
repeated. As a result, legislations and policies are being drafted, daily decisions are being scrutinized, and lessons 
are being drawn. Given the extension of such problems in the industry, one cannot stop from asking whether it was 
not preventable and that companies can catch the problem before it becomes a major issue. The structure of many 
public firms do allow for an oversight of executive offense through board activism for instance, but a more poignant 
question is about the possibility of turning toward simpler leadership approach where it would be possible to 
anticipate the outcome of leaders attitude towards achieving profitable results. The management literature does offer 
some insight into this age old problem through agency theory (Donaldson, 1990) and stewardship theory (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). In all, the underlying principle of those theories is that business leaders were entrusted as 
caretaker of the organization, and are allowed to make the calls on the use of firms‟ resources to their best judgment. 
T 
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They are given allowance for personal judgment in their decision making, which theoretically should always be in 
line with the benefit of the company. The operational word here is: „personal judgment‟. As such, leaders‟ behavior 
is therefore guided by their interpretation of „personal judgment‟ which can be traced through the (monetary) results 
of their activities and the costs of such effort. Some leaders believe that „it takes money to make money‟, while 
some strongly consider a more conservative approach, thinking that the responsibility entrusted to them by the 
shareholders requires them to adopt a careful spending and use of company resources. The latter approach is often 
guided by a desire to align their personal judgment to shareholders expectations (i.e., maximizing profit). 
 
The following research questions are addressed in this paper: 
 
 Can individual leaders have their own distinguishable financial signature, which in turn is traceable through 
the firm‟s financial results? 
 Will it be possible to use the financial signature as a framework to control executives‟ behavior, and 
eventually use it as part of the firm‟s strategy formulation? 
 
The paper starts with a review of the leadership theories and the proposed concept of outcome-based 
leadership. A description of the procedures used in the study will then follow. A discussion of the results and an 
assessment of the proposed framework are finally presented. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A great deal of work in management research have been focused on leadership, with special attention to the 
assumption that leadership is a solution to the problem of collective effort in the corporate world, which attributed a 
special importance to leaders and their influence on the fate of their organizations.  A review of the current 
leadership theories (trait, behavioral, participative, situational, contingency, transactional, and transformational 
theories) reveals such deficiency, which directly points toward the need for an outcome-based perspective of 
leadership theory. This study argues that the absence of performance-based view of leadership comes from an 
„agency‟ outlook on corporate leaders, which views top managers in the modern firms as agents whose interests may 
diverge from those of their principals -- the shareholders -- where both parties are utility maximizers. In another 
words, the current perspective on leadership often fail to add the „stewardship‟ roles of corporate leaders, in which 
their motives should be aligned with the objectives of their principals. This tension between agency and stewardship 
is nothing new in the management literature, yet it could be one of critical elements of Leadership.  The value 
creation responsibility of a corporate leaders lies between the preservation of the firms‟ assets and profit 
maximization, which are both entrusted to top managers.  The addition of „stewardship‟ role of leaders lead to the 
explanation of direct influence that they have on their firm‟s financial results, which can be used as one of their 
leadership measure. This can be achieved by the assessment of their resource utilization and value-adding propensity 
in the course of performing their „stewardship‟ and „agency‟ roles. 
 
Moreover, there is a universal attitude and assumption that corporate leaders are the embodiment of their 
corporation, with the implication that their firm‟s performance is in direct relation with the personal behavior of 
such leaders. While there has always been an ongoing debate between the purposeful (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and 
hapless (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) organization, the unchanging common trait of those two types of organizational 
archetype has always been leadership influence. The latter has always perceived as having social influence and goal 
setting role (Bass, 1990; Zaccaro and Klimoski, 2001), which should have been used as a basis for evaluating 
organizations as the resultant of leaders work. The explanations in the field however diverge from the leadership 
theories: economic factors are used to explain organizational decisions (Porter, 1980; 2009); and explanations that 
appear to be independent from the individuals involved in the work are often used to investigate corporate financial 
outcomes. Yet, everyday conversations and popular business press always closely associate every decision to the 
leaders‟ personal traits. In this work, the focus will be on the importance of the imprint that corporate leaders have 
on their organizations and how does it affect the outcome of the firm. A measure of such unique imprint will be 
ultimately proposed in this study. 
 
Corporate leaders, specifically CEOs, in their executive role are perceived as not having personal marks on 
their organization. The general assumption in the management field is that they are acting as the main executor of 
the firms‟ strategy and that they can be shaped by the organization, i.e., they can adapt to the corporate strategy as 
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they move from one firm to another. Analyses of decision trends of individual CEOs however can point to the fact 
that CEOs have partiality towards certain financial management style, which will affect the performance of their 
firm (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Such preference may be traceable, and therefore measureable, in the 
organizational outcomes. This is not anything new despite its apparent absence in many organizational behavior and 
leadership theories. Cyert & March (1963) already argued that decision outcomes such as those that are done at the 
level of CEOs are the product of behavioral factors rather than “mechanical quest for optimization”. Bounded 
rationality, coupled with multiple and conflicting goals that reflect multiple options, and varying economic 
motivations, all conspire to fail any techno-economic approach to the process of leading an organization. Behavioral 
components always stand in the way of the CEOs decision process, leaving the opportunity for her to use personal 
management styles in performing her leadership role.  This has been observed very early on by Scott and Mitchel 
(1972) that the leader‟s values can directly affect their perceptions: it is very possible that a decision maker can 
arrive at a set of perceptions that suggest a certain choice but discarded that choice on the basis of values.  
 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
 
The following section outline the procedures employed in this research and the sources of data.  A two step 
approach was used in this work: 
 
 A classification work to improve the framework that was developed in the literature review, which 
generated a better typology of leaders, in conformance to Prince‟s finding (2005).  
 Data Analysis, using two types of financial measures: (a) resource utilization, which determines the pattern 
of expenses and investments by the firm and (b) value adding capacity, which determines the financial 
results as outcome of the leader‟s decision. 
 
3.1.  Classification steps for estimating Financial Signature 
 
A review of the role of corporate leaders points to two main characteristics that are at the heart of their 
leadership approach: resource utilization and value adding. While resource utilization is the measure of how she 
uses resources and spends money, value adding is an indication of the degrees at which she makes an effort at 
improving the company‟s products and services towards higher profits. In this work, these two characteristics will 
be used as a concrete measure of the leader‟s performance. It is assumed that most decisions that the corporate 
leader make involve either of those two factors. Prince (2004) indicates that the leader‟s financial signature is 
determined by their attitude towards resources utilization and propensity for value adding activities, which will 
always be reflected in their behavior. Indeed, the combination of those two factors will drastically affect the firm‟s 
performance as indicated by Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Resource Utilization vs. Value Adding 
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A close analysis of these two factors provides an indication of the efficiency of the managerial style that the 
leader is using (see Figure 1).  Specifically, the types of resource utilization/value adding preferred by the leaders 
show the following outcome: 
 
 High/High: when the leader believes that one has to spend money to make money, by supporting sales, 
marketing, research and development, or even the CEOs personal expenses; while at the same time no 
expenses were spared in improving the company products. Often, this approach favors products that have 
achieved high market penetration that will ultimately lead to very profitable product. Unfortunately, the 
organization‟s survival is at stake if this strategy does not work. The personal style of such leader can be 
characterized as extravagant, with very high expenses that failed CEOs are often entangled into misconduct 
due to the pressure for high expense as was the case for the CEO of Tyco in the early 2000s.  
 Low/Low: at the opposite of the previous strategy is a leader that favors very lowest value in utilizing 
resources and designing products. Such approach often results in very limited investments for building bare 
bone products that meet customers‟ expectations, and restricting therefore the potential for returns. These 
types of leader often end up running underperforming company that is lagging behind its competitors. 
Often, the CEOs in this category is focused on short term revenue and with no concern for future 
development. 
 High/Low: these are the leaders with very strong vision for their products. These types of leaders often are 
very passionate about their products that they are personally involved in the development of the product. It 
is often possible that such leaders are willing to forgo short-term benefits for what is perceived to be the 
much larger profit in the longer term, justifying therefore the high resource utilization. 
 Low/High: these are the CEOs that are low on resource utilization. They grudgingly spend money and will 
forever find ways to cut costs. Extreme cost controls are often the main concern of such leaders.  
 
In sum, approaches to using resources available to the CEOs, coupled with their propensity to add value to 
products not only determine the performance of the firm, but also reflect the financial signature of such leaders. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between value adding and resource utilization, which is the basis for identifying and 
measuring such signature. 
 
Using corporate historical data gives the opportunity of using a simpler way to characterize the financial 
signature. Simple financial metrics from such source would reduce the potential complexity of operationalizing the 
financial signature concept. We decided therefore to use the gross margin, or the difference between revenues and 
direct costs of gaining those revenues, as a measure of earning potential for the firm.  It can safely be used as an 
estimate of the leader‟s ability to add value, especially if the leader‟s tenure is long enough to affect the company‟s 
strategies.  Resource utilization can be estimated from the company expenses as a proportion of revenue.  These two 
values (i.e., gross margin and resource utilizations) were used to estimate the financial signature of the company 
leader by locating the firm in the framework developed in Figure 1. 
 
3.2.   Sample Selection 
 
A random sample of companies (n=57) from the Fortune500 database was created in this study, based on 
their CEO tenure and the completeness of the financial information availability between 1990 and 2005. The names 
of some of the organizations may have changed during that period. However we are using the most recent company 
name as indicated in Table 1.  
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Table 1. List of Companies and CEOs 
ID CEO_Name Entity Name 
CEO01 Ayer.William.S. Alaska Air Group Inc 
CEO02 Shoen.Edward.J. Amerco 
CEO03 Pugh.David.L. Applied Industrial Technologies Inc 
CEO04 Woertz.PatriciaA. Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 
CEO05 Owens.JamesW. Caterpillar Inc 
CEO06 O'Reilly.DavidJ. Chevron Corp. 
CEO07 Joos.David.W. CMS Energy Corp. 
CEO08 Ryan,ThomasM. CVS Caremark Corp. 
CEO09 Otis.Clarence.Jr. Darden Restaurants Inc 
CEO10 Cook.William.M. Donaldson.Company.Inc 
CEO11 Liveris.AndrewN. Dow.Chemical.Company 
CEO12 Craver.Theodore.F. Edison.International 
CEO13 Rowe.John.W. Exelon.Corp. 
CEO14 Ulsh.Gordon.A. Exide.Technologies 
CEO15 Jennings.Michael.C. Frontier.Oil.Corp. 
CEO16 Scozzafava.Ralph.P. Furniture.Brands.International.Inc 
CEO17 Immelt.JeffreyR. General.Electric.Company 
CEO18 Larsen.Marshall.O. Goodrich.Corp. 
CEO19 Dorey.William.G. Granite.Construction.Inc 
CEO20 Scheible.David.W. Graphic.Packaging.Holding.Company 
CEO21 Wandell.Keith.E. Harley-Davidson.Inc 
CEO22 Lance.Howard.L. Harris.Corp. 
CEO23 Newsome.Gary.D. Health.Management.Associates.Inc 
CEO24 Bergman.Stanley.M. Henry.Schein.Inc 
CEO25 Hurd.MarkV. Hewlett-Packard.Company 
CEO26 Johnson.William.R. HJ.Heinz.Company 
CEO27 Ettinger.Jeffrey.M. Hormel.Foods.Corp. 
CEO28 Palmisano.SamuelJ. International.Business.Machines.Corp. 
CEO29 Main.Timothy.L. Jabil.Circuit.Inc 
CEO30 Weldon.WilliamC. Johnson.&.Johnson 
CEO31 Card.Wesley.R. Jones.Apparel.Group.Inc 
CEO32 Curlander.Paul.J. Lexmark.International.Inc 
CEO33 Eckert.Robert.A. Mattel.Inc 
CEO34 Pruitt.Gary.B. McClatchy.Company 
CEO35 Ballmer.StevenA. Microsoft.Corp. 
CEO36 Nuti.William.R. NCR.Corp. 
CEO37 DiMicco.Daniel.R. Nucor.Corp. 
CEO38 Gemunder.Joel.F. Omnicare.Inc 
CEO39 Papa.Joseph.C. Perrigo.Company 
CEO40 Kindler.JeffreyB. Pfizer.Inc 
CEO41 Foate.Dean.A. Plexus.Corp. 
CEO42 Miller.James.H. PPL.Corp. 
CEO43 Ivey.Susan.M. Reynolds.American.Inc 
CEO44 Sullivan.Frank.C. RPM.International.Inc 
CEO45 Nagarkatti.Jai.P. Sigma.Aldrich.Corp. 
CEO46 DeLoach.Harris.E.Jr. Sonoco.Products.Company 
CEO47 Schultz.Howard Starbucks.Corp. 
CEO48 Elsenhans.Lynn L. Sunoco.Inc 
CEO49 Steinhafel.GreggW. Target.Corp. 
CEO50 Bennett.Michael.L. Terra.Industries.Inc 
CEO51 Lafley.AlanG. The.Procter.&.Gamble.Company 
CEO52 Davis.D.Scott United.Parcel.Service.Inc 
CEO53 Glenn.Michael.B. Universal.Forest.Products.Inc 
CEO54 Bay.Mogens.C. Valmont.Industries.Inc 
CEO55 Seidenberg.IvanG. Verizon.Communications 
CEO56 DeGraffenreidt.James.H.Jr. WGL.Holdings.Inc 
CEO57 Lynch.Peter.L. Winn-Dixie.Stores.Inc 
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Table 2. CEO Classification by Financial Signature 
  PM  CR Financial Signature CEO_Name Entity Name 
CEO01 0.568 0.525 Conglomerator Ayer.William.S. Alaska Air Group Inc 
CEO02 0.882 1.000 Venture Capitalist Shoen.Edward.J. Amerco 
CEO03 0.037 -0.116 Trader Pugh.David.L. Applied Industrial Technologies Inc 
CEO04 0.829 0.384 Venture Capitalist Woertz.PatriciaA. Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 
CEO05 0.061 -0.939 Discounter Owens.JamesW. Caterpillar Inc 
CEO06 0.560 0.388 Conglomerator O'Reilly.DavidJ. Chevron Corp. 
CEO07 0.389 0.581 Conglomerator Joos.David.W. CMS Energy Corp. 
CEO08 1.000 0.156 Profiteer Ryan,ThomasM. CVS Caremark Corp. 
CEO09 0.187 0.522 Mercantilist Otis.Clarence.Jr. Darden Restaurants Inc 
CEO10 0.200 0.465 Trader Cook.William.M. Donaldson Company Inc 
CEO11 0.555 0.697 Conglomerator Liveris.AndrewN. Dow Chemical Company 
CEO12 0.456 0.313 Consolidator Craver.Theodore.F. Edison International 
CEO13 0.232 0.190 Trader Rowe.John.W. Exelon Corp. 
CEO14 0.198 0.249 Mercantilist Ulsh.Gordon.A. Exide Technologies 
CEO15 0.358 0.509 Conglomerator Jennings.Michael.C. Frontier Oil Corp. 
CEO16 0.565 0.702 Conglomerator Scozzafava.Ralph.P. Furniture Brands International Inc 
CEO17 0.332 0.629 Conglomerator Immelt.JeffreyR. General Electric Company 
CEO18 0.879 0.206 Profiteer Larsen.Marshall.O. Goodrich Corp. 
CEO19 0.331 0.368 Conglomerator Dorey.William.G. Granite Construction Inc 
CEO20 0.217 -0.614 Discounter Scheible.David.W. Graphic Packaging Holding Company 
CEO21 0.507 0.681 Conglomerator Wandell.Keith.E. Harley-Davidson Inc 
CEO22 0.853 0.310 Profiteer Lance.Howard.L. Harris Corp. 
CEO23 0.326 0.453 Trader Newsome.Gary.D. Health Management Associates Inc 
CEO24 0.273 0.479 Mercantilist Bergman.Stanley.M. Henry Schein Inc 
CEO25 0.269 0.235 Trader Hurd.MarkV. Hewlett-Packard Company 
CEO26 0.377 0.266 Consolidator Johnson.William.R. HJ Heinz Company 
CEO27 0.856 0.301 Profiteer Ettinger.Jeffrey.M. Hormel Foods Corp. 
CEO28 0.206 0.307 Trader Palmisano.SamuelJ. International Business Machines Corp. 
CEO29 0.288 0.306 Trader Main.Timothy.L. Jabil Circuit Inc 
CEO30 0.697 0.336 Conglomerator Weldon.WilliamC. Johnson & Johnson 
CEO31 0.107 0.262 Trader Card.Wesley.R. Jones Apparel Group Inc 
CEO32 0.447 0.227 Consolidator Curlander.Paul.J. Lexmark International Inc 
CEO33 0.783 0.765 Venture Capitalist Eckert.Robert.A. Mattel Inc 
CEO34 0.317 0.130 Trader Pruitt.Gary.B. McClatchy Company 
CEO35 0.371 0.174 Consolidator Ballmer.StevenA. Microsoft Corp. 
CEO36 0.085 0.297 Trader Nuti.William.R. NCR Corp. 
CEO37 0.596 0.158 Consolidator DiMicco.Daniel.R. Nucor Corp. 
CEO38 0.162 0.174 Trader Gemunder.Joel.F. Omnicare Inc 
CEO39 0.243 0.366 Mercantilist Papa.Joseph.C. Perrigo Company 
CEO40 0.571 0.146 Consolidator Kindler.JeffreyB. Pfizer Inc 
CEO41 0.270 0.214 Trader Foate.Dean.A. Plexus Corp. 
CEO42 0.329 0.425 Conglomerator Miller.James.H. PPL Corp. 
CEO43 0.376 -0.026 Consolidator Ivey.Susan.M. Reynolds American Inc 
CEO44 0.354 0.083 Consolidator Sullivan.Frank.C. RPM International Inc 
CEO45 0.485 0.135 Consolidator Nagarkatti.Jai.P. Sigma Aldrich Corp. 
CEO46 0.384 -0.117 Consolidator DeLoach.Harris.E..Jr. Sonoco Products Company 
CEO47 0.326 0.335 Conglomerator Schultz.Howard Starbucks Corp. 
CEO48 0.269 0.149 Trader Elsenhans.LynnL. Sunoco Inc 
CEO49 0.155 0.172 Trader Steinhafel,GreggW. Target Corp. 
CEO50 0.214 0.338 Mercantilist Bennett.Michael.L. Terra Industries Inc 
CEO51 0.329 0.353 Conglomerator Lafley,AlanG. The Procter & Gamble Company 
CEO52 0.214 -0.038 Trader Davis,D.Scott United Parcel Service Inc 
CEO53 0.141 0.162 Trader Glenn.Michael.B. Universal Forest Products Inc 
CEO54 0.206 -0.050 Trader Bay.Mogens.C. Valmont Industries Inc 
CEO55 0.020 -0.076 Trader Seidenberg,IvanG. Verizon Communications 
CEO56 0.134 0.104 Trader DeGraffenreidt.James.H. WGL Holdings Inc 
CEO57 -0.009 -0.162 Trader Lynch.Peter.L. Winn-Dixie Stores Inc 
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4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Each of the two financial signature components Resource Utilization Behavior (R), and Value-Adding 
Propensity (V) was evaluated at three levels of intensity, low (L) to medium (M) to high (H). This resulted in nine 





























Figure 2. Typology of Financial Signature (Adapted from Prince, 2001) 
 
 
Our sample CEOs are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 according to their financial signatures, in light of the 
intensity of the resource utilization behavior and resource utilization propensity. CEOs were classified into the 
following categories: 
 
 Discounter: this is the type of leader that has a very low risk tolerance and will never speculate.  She has a 
very low level of value adding propensity, which is offset by extreme thriftiness.  Such a leader may also 
have a very well implanted products and services that rarely need updating or changes.  Such may be the 
case for Caterpillar Inc.  The type of CEOs in this category tends to the details and is very control oriented.  
 Arbitrageur: this is the type of leader that seeks returns with decent returns without much risk. The main 
objective of such CEO is on return on investment, but not so much that she will pursue absolute minimum 
to pursue the opportunity. The sample in this study did not have any arbitrageur CEOs, as they cannot be 
found in mass-market retail or other commodity products: usually, she favors higher returns than these 
areas can bring. 
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 Bucaneer: this is the type of CEO that wants very high returns for very low expenditures. She tends to be a 
lone wolf, with no competitors, as she would have typically figured out how to achieve high returns on 
investment by means that no one has thought out before. Our sample did not include this type of leader. 
 Trader: This type of CEO is a leader for smaller company who like to pursue ventures without much 
available financing. She lives to buy low-value products and selling them for a high-enough gross margin 
to cover costs and any deficit from her investment activities. She is on the lower end of the value adding 
spectrum. This type of leader must constantly speculate to ensure a continuous flow of earnings. From our 
samples, many of the successful CEOs leading companies that offer innovative products that requiring 
internal R&D investments fall into this category. 
 Consolidator: This type of leader is a fairly cautious one. Very careful in her transaction, she shies away 
from cuttrhroat, low margin businesses. She will never make major investments; she invests enough to keep 
gross margins up. Adding rather than developing is the mantra for this type of leader.  
 Profiteer: This type of leader is always seeking very high value adding but does not want to utilize too 
many resources.  This requires her to look for a lower-risk product with high gross margins.  These will be 
products with shorter development cycles that provide revenue in the short term.  Unfortunately, this CEO 
may have missed the opportunity to have an even higher gross margin by adopting such attitude towards 
resource utilization.  Many organizations favor this type of CEO as she is a reliable moneymaker with her 
ability to make a lot of money with high gross margin, coupled with medium levels of resource utilization. 
 Mercantilist: this is the type of leader who likes to explore uncharted market with the generous financial 
backing of the company. Her specialty is to build empires and promote speculative ventures. She often 
requires high level of resources to support sales and marketing, or research and development, but there is 
not any concern about adding values to the products. This CEO is very good at increasing market share, 
using risky and speculative management style. 
 Conglomerator: this type of CEO is another type of empire builder, but with a preference towards adding 
values, though not too much. Her style is to build a portfolio of products through internal development or 
acquisition. While this leader likes to speculate in developing her portfolio, she is able to generate adequate 
revenue growth and market share to keep her company in the black. 
 Venture Capitalist: This is the type of CEO who believes that it takes money to make money and that it 
will require significant investment and patience to obtain the product that she wants. She is has a high level 
of tolerance for risk though. Her style is such that the majority of her investment will not result in profit, 
but those very few that are successful will generate very high returns. 
 
An analysis of our sample data, using company return and expenses show a classification that matches the 
above categories as indicated in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
CEOs, in the process of assuming two distinctive roles of agent and steward, not only have a strong 
influence on their firm‟s financial outcome, but also exhibit specific level of propensity to conserving or spending 
resources that is a direct reflection of their ability to govern in relation to their stakeholders expectations. The 
framework presented in this study uses the financial results that were generated from the CEO‟s action. It shows that 
leaders can be evaluated by the outcome of their work, and that it is possible to implement such assessment by 
linking manager personality to company financial and valuation outcome.  The outcome of such analysis provides 
insights that traditional leadership approaches do not offer, given the focus on organizational performance.  
 
The implication of our study is that the financial signature adds a new dimension to the current leadership 
and organizational behavior theories and may offer more opportunities in understanding corporate misconduct and 
ethical issues at the CEO level.  We believe that the concept of outcome-based leadership, through the financial 
signature, will benefit managers as it would show them the link between managerial finance impact at all levels of 
the company; it also provides practical ways to improve their own performance in terms of valuation and creation of 
shareholder value. Whereas for Board Members, it presents an opportunity to use an objective tool in the selection 
of a company leader, appraisal, development, and support; it can also be used as an assessment tool in leadership 
evaluation. Finally, the financial signature concept is also a valuable tool for shareholders and investors: 
stockholders can use it to predict leadership performance and assessment of the likelihood of achieving target 
returns, while investment bankers can add it to their collection of valuation tools.  
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Figure 3. Financial Signature Typology from Sample CEOs 
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